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INTRODUCrION

As we watch the sun go down, evening after evening, through the
smog across the poisoned waters of our native earth, we must ask
ourselves seriously whether we really wish some future universal historian . . .to say about us; "With all their genius and with all their

skill, they ran out of foresight and air and water andfood and ideas"
.

.

. or: "They went on playing politics until their world collapsed

around them"; or: "When they looked up, it was already too late." If
the United Nations does nothing else, it can at least serve a vital purpose in sounding the alarm.
-U Thant'

A

s the twenty-first century approaches, environmental protection

C-.is increasingly becoming an international concern. Presently, a
number of complex environmental problems plague the international

community, problems that must be dealt with expeditiously and effectively to preserve the quality and diversity of life on 'the planet.2 One
particularly vexing problem which has emerged is transboundary pollution, environmental contamination emanating from one or more
*

in 8

J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.

1. U Thant, From Statement at Commemorative Session of the General Assembly,

PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE SECRETARIES-GENERAL. OF THE UNITED NATIONS: U
THANT 1968-1971 420, 421 (Andrew W. Cordier & Max Harrelson eds., 1977). This

statement, eloquently presenting the environmental challenges facing the international community, was made on October 24, 1970, by Secretary General U Thant in
his closing remarks to the Commemorative Session of the United Nations.
2. The rapid destruction of our biosphere's forests is a prime example of the
global threat posed to quality of life and biological diversity. A significant percentage
of temperate forests in North America, Europe, North Africa, and Asia have been
destroyed, and tropical forests in South America, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern
Asia are declining at a particularly alarming rate. Kenton R. Miller et al., Deforesta-

tion and Species Loss: Responding to the Crisis, in

PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVI-

RONMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF SHARED LEADERSHIP 78-79 (Jessica T. Mathews
1991) [hereinafter PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT]. Tropical forests

ed.,
are
especially important because they "comprise a living treasurehouse-a trove of uncounted habitats and species as diverse and individual as snowflakes, linked in the
complex webs of interaction that define local ecosystems." Id.at 79. In addition to
their biological diversity, tropical forests help to stabilize the earth's climate, and are
vital "sources of food, fiber, medicines, industrial products, and genes needed to
breed the improved crop varieties upon which the world's food security rests." Id.
Unfortunately, if the present rate of deforestation continues, as many as one quarter
of the world's species will become extinct within the next two decades, causing an
"ecological decline that will threaten the health, commerce, and quality of life enjoyed by developed and developing nations alike." Id.
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States which traverses international borders to degrade the environ-

ment of neighboring States.3

In recent years, the adverse, and indeed potentially disastrous, effects of transboundary pollution have heightened awareness of, and
sensitivity to, the problem domestically and abroad. Internationally
publicized incidents, most notably the 1986 Chernobyl accident,4 have
"made clear that activities undertaken entirely within one nation's territory can have devastating effects on the territory.of neighboring
states or on global common areas, such as the atmosphere or the high
seas." 5 Accordingly, a great deal of attention has been focused on
whether States are obligated to prevent, or at least assess, the adverse
transboundary environmental effects of activities undertaken within
their own borders, as well as how to remedy the harm suffered by
neighboring States.6

However, despite the focus placed on the transboundary pollution
dilemma, the international legal system continues to have substantial
shortcomings that present major obstacles to ensuring State responsibility, victim compensation, and environmental conservation.7 As a
result, in February 1991, the United Nations Economic Commission
3.

THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POL-

1073, 1076 (2d ed. 1991).
4. On April 26, 1986, an explosion in one of the four. reactors at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant in the former Soviet Union caused the world's worst nuclear
ICY LAW

.accident.

LAKSHMAN

D. GURUSWAMY

ET AL.,

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL

LAW AND WORLD ORDER 515 (1994). The complete core meltdown is now estimated

to have released between 185 and 250 million cures of radioactive material causing
fallout over many continental European countries, a figure four to five times greater
than previous estimates by Soviet authorities. Id.; Chernobyl Update, WORLD ECOLOGY REP., Spring 1994, at 11. The Chernobyl accident killed 31 people immediately
and led to the subsequent deaths of thousands of others, forced the evacuation of
more than 225,000 people from the region, and caused billions of dollars in property

damage and lost trade. David B. Hunter, Toward Global Citizenship in International
Environmental Law, 28 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 547, 549-50 (1992) [hereinafter Hunter,
Global Citizenship].
Six months after the Chernobyl accident, on November 1, 1986, afire at the Sandoz
chemicals plant in Basel, Switzerland produced clouds of hazardous gases and released approximately 1246 tons of pesticides into the Rhine River. Sudhir K. Chopra,
Multinational Corporationsin the Aftermath of Bhopal: The Need for a New Comprehensive Global Regime for TransnationalCorporateActivity, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.235,
245 (1994). The spill caused extensive contamination of the Rhine, killing virtually all
animal life along a 300-mile stretch of the river, and spread to Germany, France, and

the Netherlands. Id.; Andrew Kelly, Salmon Still Shun Rhine Despite Drop in Pollution, BC CYCLE,Mar. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. As a
result, Sandoz incurred several hundred million dollars of liability for damages caused
by the fire and spill, which it only recently finished paying. Kelly, supra.
5. Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, InternationalImpact Assessment, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 25, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Kass & Gerrard I].
6. Id.
7. Helmut J.Heiss, Legal ProtectionAgainst Transboundary Radiation Pollution:
A Treaty Proposal,4 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REP. 167, 167 (1993).
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for Europe ("ECE") 8 held the Convention on Environmental Impact
Assessment in a Transboundary Context 9 at Espoo, Finland to formulate mechanisms to effectively monitor and control transboundary pollution. Significantly, the Espoo Convention established . an
environmental impact assessment ("EIA") process. resembling the
United States' National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"),1° re8. The ECE, one of five United Nations regional Commissions, is composed of
more than 30 industrialized nations, including Western and Eastern European states,
the United States,'Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Japan. Amy A. Fraenkel,
Comment, The Convention on Long-Range TransboundaryAir Pollution: Meeting the
Challenge of InternationalCooperation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J.447, 448 n.5 (1989); Joel
A. Gallob, Birth of the North American Transboundary Environmental Plaintiff:
TransboundaryPollution and (he 1979 Draft Treaty for Equal Access and Remedy, 15
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 85, 123 (1991); Jeffrey L. Roelofs, United States-CanadaAir
Quality Agreement: A Framework for Addressing Transboundary Air Pollution
Problems, 26 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 421, 431 n.101 (1993).

9. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 800 (1991) [hereinafter Espoo Convention].
Prior to the Espoo Convention, the ECE adopted several other multilateral environmental agreements, including: Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution Concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen Oxides or Their Transboundary Fluxes, Oct. 31, 1988, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 212 (1989);
Protocol to the 1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on the
Reduction of Sulphur Emissions or Their Transboundary Fluxes by at Least Thirty
Percent, July 8, 1985, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 707 (1988); Convention on Long-Range
Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979).
Moreover, in 1985, the European Community adopted the Directive on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the Environment, Council Directive 85/337/EEC, 1985 O.J. (L 175) 40, to harmonize procedures for the
development, planning, and implementation of new development by member nations.
For a discussion of the EC Directive, see Paul D. McHugh, The European Community
Directive-An Alternative EnvironmentalImpact Procedure?,34 NAT. RESOURCES J.
589 (1994).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370c (1988 & Supp. V 1.993). NEPA was enacted by Congress in 1969 as an attempt "to reform the governmental decisionmaking process
concerning natural resources and the environment." SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG,
supra note 3, at 66. The express purposes of NEPA are:
[tjo declare a national policy which will encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and [the] environment; to promote efforts which will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate the health and welfare of man; to enrich the understanding of the ecological systems and natural resources important to the Nation; and to
establish a Council on Environmental Quality.
42 U.S.C. § 4321.
Pursuant to NEPA, federal agencies and departments are required to examine the
environmental impacts of "major [flederal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the human environment" and to consider "alternatives to the proposed action." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(C), (C)(iii). While NEPA makes environmental protection part of the
mandate of every federal agency and department, "Congress did not establish environmental protection as an exclusive goal; rather, it desired a reordering of priorities,
so that environmental costs and benefits will assume their proper place along with
other considerations." Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc., v. United States
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Thus, courts have
generally held that NEPA "contain[s] few, if any, substantive requirements," merely
requiring federal agencies and departments to follow the EIS procedure and "make
reasoned decisions, after the requisite public comment, balancing environmental and
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quiring signatories to notify, fully inform, and grant other signatory
nations the right to participate in the planning and execution of new
development
with potential transboundary pollution effects.11 Moreover, the Convention
established dispute resolution and post-project
analysis procedures to be followed by signatory nations. 2 By June 11,
1991, twenty-six nations, including the United States, Canada, the European Community ("EC") countries, and a number of Central and
East European countries signed the Espoo Convention. 3
This Note assesseS the probable impact of the Espoo Convention in
light of the Stockholm and Rio mandates to prevent transboundary
environmental harm,' 4 and current relations between members of the
international community. Part I analyzes the major substantive and
procedural requirements of the Espoo Convention, highlighting the
rights created and obligations imposed upon the signatories. Part II
evaluates the implementation and, enforceability of the Espoo Convention, exploring the degree to which signatories can, ,and must, adhere to the Convention's dictates. This Part specifically focuses on
NEPA, the EIA statute that has served as the model for similar statutes enacted by other signatory nations to the Convention."5 Lastly,
in response to its flaws, Part III examines mechanisms to more effectively achieve the Convention's goal of reducing transboundary
pollution.
I. THE EsPoo CONVENTION AND. THE DUTY TO AVOID
ENVIRONMENTAL HARM

In the past several decades, the principle that States are required to
ensure that activities conducted within their jurisdiction or control do
not damage other States or the commons' 6 has become an increasother relevant factors." Stephen L. Kass & Michael B. Gerrard, The EIS at 25, N.Y.
L.J., Oct. 28, 1994, at 3 [hereinafter Kass & Gerrard II].
11. See infra notes 31-39 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
13. As of June 11, 1991, the following nations were signatories to the Espoo Convention: Albania, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,

Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Ukranian Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom, and the United States.

Espoo Convention, supra note 9, at 30 I.L.M. 800. The Convention will enter into
force after the United Nations has received instruments of "ratification, acceptance,
approval or accession" from 16 signatory nations. Id. arts. 17(3), 18(1).
14. See infra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
15. See Peter H. Sand, InternationalCooperation: The Environmental Experience,
in

PRESERVING THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT,

supra note 2, at 236, 262.

16. The "global commons" are "those areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction such as the high seas, the sea-bed, Antarctica, outer space, or the ozone layer."
DAVID HUNTER ET AL., U.N. ENV'T PROGRAMME, 2 CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 38 (1994).
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ingly important concept of international environmental law.' 7 This
principle was first articulated in the Trail Smelter arbitration," a dispute between the United States and Canada involving transboundary
air pollution. In Trail Smelter, the United States brought suit against
Canada asserting that sulphur dioxide fumes from a smelter in Trail,
British Columbia were causing environmental damage to property in
Washington State. 19 The Arbitral tribunal determined that:
under the principles of international law.., no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory, in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
persons therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.2 °

Consequently, the tribunal held the Canadian Government liable for
the toxic fume emissions, ordering Canada
to pay compensation and
21

prevent future environmental harm.
More recently, the United Nations has declared that governments
have an affirmative duty to prevent environmental damage to other
nations and to the commons. As Principle 21 of the Stockholm declaration, and more recently Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, proclaim:
States have, in accordance with Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law... the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of their States or of areas beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction. 22
17. Id. at 21. International environmental law consists of rights and obligations
arising from the following sources:. (1) treaties, conventions, and protocols adopted on
a bilateral basis (that is, between two States), or on a regional or global basis; (2)
binding acts, decisions, or other measures of international organizations taken pursuant to authority from treaties, conventions, protocols'or other agreements; (3) customary international law derived from consistent state practice, international
consensus, and the "non-binding sources of 'soft law,' reflected in guidelines, recommendations and other non-binding acts adopted by States and international institutions"; and (4) judgements of international courts and tribunals on environmental
issues such as transboundary pollution, fisheries conservation, and atmospheric nu-

clear tests. Philippe Sands, Introduction to

GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW

at xxi-

xxiii (Philippe Sands ed., 1994) [hereinafter Sands I].
18. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (1949).
19. Id. at 1917.
20. Id. at 1965.
21. Id. at 1965-66. As Professor Malone has observed, the Trail Smelter case

stands for two fundamental international law principles: (1) a state alleging environ-

mental damage from a transboundary source must show "material damage over and

above a violation of sovereignty" and (2) "a state may be held responsible for pollution by private parties within its territory if such pollution results in demonstrable
injury to another state or to the property or persons therein." Linda A. Malone,' The

Chernobyl Accident: A Case Study in InternationalLaw Regulating State Responsibility for TransboundaryNuclear Pollution, 12 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 203, 209-10 (1987).

22. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, princ. 21, reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]; Rio -Declaration on Environment
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Furthermore, the Rio Declaration expressly requires the preparation
of ElAs for new development with potential transboundary pollution
effects. Principle 17 of the Rio Declaration explicitly provides that
"[e]nvironmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant
adverse impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a
competent national authority." 3 Thus, international law dictates that,
to avoid ecological harm to other nations, individual nations must cooperate in investigating, identifying, and implementing measures to
prevent such damage.
A.

Rights and Obligations Under the Espoo Convention

Importantly, the Espoo Convention explicitly specifies each nation's rights and obligations toward other signatory nations. The Convention does not apply to transboundary pollution sources preexisting
the Convention's ratification, nor does the Convention enable signatories to actually prevent one another from commencing and completing
disputed projects. Under the Espoo Convention, however, signatory
nations are required to prepare EIAs to facilitate environmentally responsible planning and execution of proposed projects with potential
adverse transboundary pollution effects.
In essence, the EIA process is one in which a comprehensive examination of proposed activities is undertaken to "maximize the potential
for environmentally sound and sustainable development."2 4 EIA requires a careful study of the likely ecological effects of activities
before they are carried out, to ascertain whether those activities
should in fact be permitted.2" The EIA process "integrates ecological
awareness into all planning and decision-making, especially agriculture, industry, transport, tourism, and regional development '26 and is
"now considered the first and probably the most important step in
preserving the quality of the environment. ' 27 Therefore, the EIA process is designed to ensure that:
(i) the appropriate government authorities have fully identified and
considered the environmental effects of proposed activities, as well
as alternatives that avoid or mitigate the environmental effects, and
(ii) affected citizens have an opportunity to understand the proposed project or policy and to express their views to [the] decision-.
makers in advance. 28
and Development, June 14, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1, princ. 2, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
23. Rio Declaration, supra note 22, princ. 17.
24. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
25. Sands I, supra note 17, at Xxxix.
26. McHugh, supra note 9, at 593.

27. Id. at 592.
28. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 26.
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While the EIA process originated with NEPA, it has increasingly been
utilized for investigating and communicating potential transboundary
environmental impacts in many contexts, 29 and more than seventy-five
nations have enacted EIA laws.3"
The Espoo Convention expressly requires that each signatory "take
all appropriate and effective' measures to prevent, reduce and control
significant adverse transboundary environmental impact from proposed activities."'" Therefore, ElAs must be conducted at an early
stage prior to a decision on a proposed activity being made.3 2 Specifically, the State initiating the proposed action (i.e., the "party of origin") must notify every party "which... may be an affected [p]arty as
early as possible and no later than when informing its own public
about that proposed activity."'33 Moreover, the party of origin must
provide: (1) relevant information on the proposed activity and its possible significant adverse transboundary impact, 3 .(2) "the nature of
the possible decision[s], 35 (3) "[a]n indication of a reasonable time"
in which the potentially affected party may reply, 36 and (4)." [rlelevant
information regarding the environmental impact assessment procedure" to be utilized.37
In turn, the potentially affected party is required to respond to the
party of origin within the period specified in the notification by acknowledging receipt of the notification, and indicating whether that
nation intends to participate in the party of origin's EIA procedure.38
If the potentially affected party in fact participates in the EIA procedure, the party of origin is entitled to request "reasonably obtainable
information relating to the potentially affected environment under the
to
jurisdiction of the affected [p]arty," which the latter is obligated
39
release so that a complete and accurate EIA can be prepared.
In preparing its EIA, the party of origin is required by Appendix II
of the Espoo Convention to address a number of considerations. At a
minimum, an EIA must contain: (1) "[a] description of the proposed
29. Id at 27.
30. McHugh, supra note 9, at 592.
31. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(1).
32. Id. art. 2(3).
33. Id. art. 3(1).
34. Id. art. 3(2)(a).
35. Id art. 3(2)(b).
36. Id art. 3(2)(c).,
37. Id art. 3(5)(a). Significantly, Principle 19 of the Rio Declaration confirmed
the Espoo Convention's prior notification and disclosure of information provisions:
"States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary
environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good
faith." Rio Declaration, supra note 22, princ. 19.
38. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(3).
39. Id. art. 3(6).
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activity and its purpose";40 (2) a description of reasonable alternatives
to the proposed activity, including a "no-action" alternative; 4 ' (3) a
"description of the environment likely to be significantly [adversely]
affected by the proposed activity and its alternatives";42 (4) "[a] description of the potential environmental impact of the proposed activity and its alternatives," as well as "an estimation of [their]
significance" ;43 (5) "[a] descriptiori of mitigation measures";" (6) an
explanation of the "predictive methods" and "relevant environmental
data" employed;4" (7) an identification of "uncertainties" and "gaps in
knowledge";46 (8) "[an] outline for monitoring and management
programmes "1;47 and (9) "[a] non-technical summary including a visual
presentation" of maps and graphs.48
I Like NEPA, the Espoo Convention clearly provides for, and indeed
encourages, public participation as an integral part of the EIA process.4 9 The Espoo Convention mandates that:.
concerned [plarties shall ensure that the public of the affected
[p]arty in the areas likely to be affected be informed of, and be provided with possibilities for making comments or objections on, the
proposed activity, and for the transmittal of these comments or objections to the competent authority of the [p]arty of origin, either
directly to50 this authority or, where appropriate, through the [p]arty
of origin.

Yet, even after the opportunity for public participation has been made
available, the party of origin is not required under the Espoo Convention to respect the concerns of those who will be affected by selecting
the least environmentally harmful alternative. Thus, although the
party of origin must adhere to the procedural guidelines of the Convention, the ultimate substantive decision regarding which development option to choose is left in the hands of the State that proposed
the very project in the first place.
After a decision has been made, a post-project analysis may be undertaken at the request of concerned signatories. The Espoo Convention provides that such an analysis is warranted if "the [p]arty of
40. Id. app.
41. Id. app.
42. Id app.
43. Id. app.
44. Id. app.
45. Id. app.
46. Id. app.

H(a).
1I(b).
II(c).
1I(d).
II(e).

II(f).

11(g).

47. Id app. II(h).
48. Id app. II(i).
49. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration clarified what is meant by effective public
participation by explaining that "each individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities ... and the
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes... [including] judicial and
administrative proceedings." Rio Declaration, supra note 22, princ. 10.
50. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 3(8).
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origin or the affected [plarty has reasonable grounds for concluding
that there is a significant adverse transboundary impact or factors
have been discovered which may result in such an impact."'" If a
post-project analysis is conducted, the concerned parties are required
to consult on necessary measures to reduce or eliminate the impact.
B.

Cooperation in Scientific Research

The Espoo Convention, like many environmental agreements, includes provisions aimed at "guiding and facilitating the research, anal-.
ysis and dissemination of scientific. research."52 Under the Espoo
Convention, signatory nations are encouraged to establish research
programs geared toward "[i]mproving existing qualitative and quantitative methods for assessing" transboundary impacts,53 "[a]chieving a
better understanding of cause-effect relationships and their role in integrated environmental management,"54 and "analyzing and monitoring the [effective and] efficient implementation of decisions on
proposed activities."55 Thus, one of the central purposes of the Espoo
Convention is to provide a scientific foundation upon Which new development of signatory States can be planned, eva luated, and executed in a more uniform, environmentally sound manner.
C. Implementation and Dispute Resolution
Significantly, the Espoo Convention does not establish a "super enforcement" authority to oversee the implementation of the treaty and
settle disputes between signatory nations. Instead, the Espoo Convention merely creates a rather weak "Secretariat," which is only empowered to "conven[e] and prepar[e] meetings of the -[p]arties,"56 and
"transni[t] reports and other information .

.

. to the [p]arties." 57

Therefore, the Secretariat serves an entirely informational, administrative function and lacks the authority to implement and enforce the
Convention.58
51. Id. art.-7(2).
52. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 16, at 17.
53. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 9(a).
54. Id. art. 9(b).
55. Id. art. 9(c).
56. Id. art. 13(a).
57. Id. art. 13(b).
58. Despite the weakness of the Secretariat, the Convention can be effectively implemented to the extent that the signatories are willing and able to comply with its

mandates. One example of cooperation under the Espoo Convention was the delay
in the construction of a 12-mile, $6 billion dollar bridge-tunnel between Sweden and

Denmark because an EIA of the proposed project had not been prepared. Bridge
Planned Between Sweden, Denmark Suffers Setback Following Critical Reports, Int'l
Envtl. Daily (BNA), Mar. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File. In
opposing the continuation of the project, a Swedish review panel and an international
panel of scientists from nations potentially adversely affected by the bridge-tunnel,
determined that the "already polluted and oxygen depleted Baltic Sea" would be fur-
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If a dispute arises between two or more parties regarding the interpretation or application of the Convention, the parties are encouraged
to negotiate,5 9 and have the option to submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") 6 0 or request arbitration. 6' The
Espoo Convention is not peculiar in this respect, because "virtually no
environmental treaty provides for compulsory'adjudication or arbitration."'62 Thus, in effect, the mandates of the Espoo Convention cannot
be "imposed" on any individual signatory State, because their compli-,
ance and submission to dispute resolution are strictly voluntary.
D. Activities Subject to the Espoo Convention
The Espoo Convention places limitations on the types of new development subject to the EIA requirement. Specifically, Appendix I of
'the Convention lists seventeen activities for which EIAs must be prepared. Among the enumerated activities are: oil refineries,63 thermal'
power stations,64 smelting operations, 65 new highways, long-distance
rail lines, airports,66 pipelines,67 ports,68 dams,69 major mining, 70 and
deforestation of large areas. 7t Further, the Convention provides that
any signatory may request an EIA for other activities that are not
expressly listed in Appendix I, but which may nevertheless have significant transboundary environmental impacts.72 When the activity at
issue is not explicitly listed in Appendix I, the parties must consult and
consider the activity's size,7 3 location,74 and, most importantly, "effects on humans or on-valued species,'? 75 to ascertain whether an EIA
should be conducted.
ther ecologically harmed. Id. Therefore, to satisfy the mandates of the Espoo Convention, both panels recommended halting the project and requested the selection of
a less ecologically destructive alternative. Id.
59. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, *art. 15(1).
60. Id. art. 15(2)(a). To resolve international environmental impact disputes, the
ICJ has "established a special Environmental Panel composed of judges who, while
continuing to serve as members of the full court," utilize their technical knowledge
and interest to more effectively determine the proper course of action. Kass & Gerrard II, supra note 10, at 9.
61. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 15(2)(b).
62. Hunter, Global Citizenship, supra note 4, at 551. As a result, nations may
"simply opt out when it comes to deciding tough environmental questions." Id.
63. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, app. I(1).
64. Id. app. 1(2).
65. Id. app. 1(4).
66. Id. app. 1(7).
67. Id. app. I(8).
68. Id. app. 1(9).
69. Id. app. 1(11).
70. Id. app. 1(14).
71. Id. app. 1(17).
72. Id. app. III.
73. Id. app. III(1)(a).
74. Id. app. III(1)(b).
75. Id. app. III(1)(c).
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Where consultations do not lead to an agreement on the nature of
the impacts or the need for an EIA in a particular case, a party may
request. that an independent three-person "inquiry commission" be established to conduct its own EIA. 6 The commission is to consist of
one "scientific or technical expert" selected by the party requesting
the inquiry, a second such expert selected by the party being challenged, and a third expert selected by mutual agreement. 77 The Convention requires that the States involved assist the inquiry commission
by providing facts, documents, and testimony pertinent to its decision.78 After it has considered all of the relevant information, the inquiry commission must (1) render a decision by a majority vote, 79 and
(2) release a final report "based on accepted scientific principles,"
which sets forth the majority and any dissenting view to all the parties
to the inquiry."0 One must acknowledge, however, that due to the
Secretariat's lack of enforcement authority, the inquiry commission's
decision will not be adhered to by signatories disagreeing with it, unless those signatories voluntarily choose to comply.
E. Bilateraland Multilateral Co-operationand Agreements
Although the Espoo Convention does not establish an effective enforcement authority, the Convention clearly permits signatories to impose more stringent requirements upon themselves, 8 and enter into
subsequent bilateral and multilateral agreements to fulfill their Convention responsibilities and reduce transboundary pollution.82 For instance, States are permitted to forge their own "[i]nstitutional,
administrative, and other arrangements

.

.

on reciprocal and

equivalent basis,"8 3 further develop and harmonize methods for the
identification and assessment of transboundary impacts, 84 and create
joint monitoring programs, 85 independent of the Convention's mandates. Therefore, assuming signatory nations are willing and able to
cooperate, they can work constructively outside of the Convention's
confines to make genuine efforts to reduce transboundary pollution.
II.

IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEABILITY OF THE

Espoo

CONVENTION

While its goals are noble, the Espoo Convention may be rightly criticized as yet another body of "soft law" espousing aspirational princi76. Id. app. IV(1)-(2).
77. Id.. app. IV(2).
78. Id. app. IV(7)(a)-(b).
79. Id. app. IV(12).
80., Id. app. IV(14).
81. Id. app. VI(1).
82. Id. app. VI(2)(a)-(g).
83. Id app. VI(2)(b).
84. Id. app. VI(2)(d).
85. Id. app. VI(2)(g).
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pies that in practice will not be realized. 86 As previously discussed,
the Espoo Convention does not create a super enforcement authority
to implement its mandates, ensure compliance with the EIA process,
and settle disputes between signatory nations.87 In fact, nothing exists
in the Convention to coerce signatory nations responsible for unwise
and ecologically unsustainable new development to conduct EIAs at
all.' Unfortunately, absent a super enforcement authority, "sovereign states are not likely to voluntarily comply with provisions which
may not be in tune with their primary political objectives." 89 Even if
signatories attempt to comply, simple disputes over ambiguities in the
Convention's language or procedure-issues which cah and should effectively dealt with by administrative oversight-will not be resolved,
because there is no specialized agency to authoritatively answer those

86. Apparently, national sovereignty concerns were primarily re.sponsible for the
Espoo Convention's lack of substantive bite. In the international arena, sovereignty
"signifies independence; that is, the right to exercise, within a portion of the globe and
to the exclusion of other States, the functions of a State, such as the exercise of jurisdiction and enforcement of laws over persons therein." HuNTR ET AL., supra note
16, at 36.
87. Due to the limited quantity and efficacy of transnational enforcement mechanisms, particularly in the field of environmental protection, "the international system
as currently structured invites the proliferation of holdouts, free riders, laggards,
scofflaws, and defectors.", David A. Wirth, The International Trade Regime and the
Municipal Law of FederalStates: How Close a Fit?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389,
1391 (1992) [hereinafter Wirth, Trade Regime].
88. Due to the scope of the transboundary pollution problem and the unwillingness of nations to genuinely cooperate, a coordinated "internationalized" approach
needs to be enforced. The inadequacy of purely domestic environmental protection
efforts, coupled with "the growing perception of the global nature of many environmental problems [have] revealed the shortcomings of voluntary and national responses." Robert W. Hahn & Kenneth R. Richards, The Internationalization of
Environmental Regulation, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421, 423 (1989).
89. Michael Robins, Comment, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The
Integration of Free Trade and the Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 123, 132
(1993). Indeed, as one commentator has indicated:
[a] key factor in a country's willingness to agree to concrete pollution reductions at the international level is its nationalself-interest. Factors affecting
national self-interest include the environmental damage suffered by a given
country, political pressure to address environmental issues, domestic economic interests, and the costs of reducing pollution.
Fraenkel, supra note 8, at 463. When multilateral treaties enter into force, "States
undertaking major environmental obligations [involving significant economic and social costs] often want assurances that their treaty partners.., are in fact implementing
the same requirements," to prevent those partners from gaining unfair competitive
advantage through noncompliance. David A. Wirth, Reexamining Decision-Making
Processes in International Environmental Law, 79 IOWA. L. REV. 769, 779 (1994)
[hereinafter Wirth, Reexamining InternationalLaw]. For a thorough discussion of the
problems posed by the voluntary imposition of, and compliance with, international
environmental law, see Roseann Eshbach, Comment, A Global Approach to the Protection of the Environment: Balancing State Sovereignty and Global Interests, 4 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 271 (1990).
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questions and settle those disputes." Thus, a distinct problem is
posed by the Convention's failure to provide a viable means to mediate even common, expected conflicts.
Ideally, for the international EIA process to work properly, each
nation must be willing to cede authority to a Specialized agency with
the authority and ability to remedy the shortcomings evident in the
Espoo Convention. As Professor Nicholas Robinson has observed,
"EIA works best when an independent authority is available to oversee the process."'" To cope with pressing international environmental
problems such as transboundary pollution, supranational authorities
are needed to exercise some of the sovereign authority traditionally
guarded by national governments.92
Yet, for this to occur, the international community must move away
from the myopic notion of the nation-state as the supreme basis for
law. Undeniably, "the notion of sovereignty which underlies the current [international legal] regime poses insurmountable obstacles when
the problems to be addressed are transnational in scope." 9 3 In light of
the truly global nature of transboundary pollution, "our accepted definition of the limits of national sovereignty as coinciding with national
borders is obsolete." 94 As such, individual nations must acknowledge
that for the good of the international community, and ultimately for
themselves, the state sovereignty paradigm cannot continue to prevail
in the EIA context, because it thwarts genuine efforts to combat transboundary pollution and the corresponding realization of transnational
benefits.
Unfortunately, at the present time, international relations have not
advanced far enough to make the formation of a super enforcement
authority a likelihood in the transnational EIA context. 95 The Espoo
Convention reflects this reality, depending upon the cooperation of
each signatory to implement the provisions, of the Convention within
its own borders. Article II of the Espoo Convention expressly states,
"Each [p]arty shall take the necessary legal, administrative or other
90. The absence of such a "gap filler" is a problem that is not encountered by
federal agencies and departments in the United States under NEPA, which rely on the
Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") and the EPA to serve that vital role. See,
e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 4342-4344, 4361b-c (1988).
91. Nicholas A. Robinson, The 1991 Bellagio Conference on U.S.-U.S.S.R. Environmental Protection Institution: International Trends in Environmental Impact Assessment, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF.L.'REv. 591, 594 (1992).

92. Jessica T. Mathews, Redefining Security

FOREIGN AFF.,

Spring 1989, at 162,

174.
93. Philippe J. Sands, The Environment, Community and InternationalLaw, 30
HARV. INT'L L.J. 393, 393 (1989) [hereinafter Sands II].
94. Mathews, supra note 92, at 174.
95. As one commentator has noted, "States continue to play the primary and
dominant role in the international legal order, both as the principal creators of the
rules of international law and the principal holders of rights and obligations under
those rules." Sands I, supra note 17, at xvii.
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measures to implement the provisions of this Convention, including
...

the establishment of an environmental impact assessment proce-

dure that permits public participation and preparation of... environmental impact documentation. ' 96 Accordingly, to illustrate how the
Espoo Convention will be implemented and enforced, this Part of the
Note focuses on NEPA, the environmental impact statute enacted by
the United States that is the model for similar statutes adopted by
other signatory nations to the Espoo Convention.97
By its terms, it is not clear whether NEPA only applies to major
federal actions originating within domestic borders. 98 When one examines the text of NEPA, one finds language suggesting possible extraterritorial 99 application of the statute. Section 102(2)(F) of NEPA
indicates that all federal agencies must "recognize the worldwide and
long-range character of environmental problems and, where consistent with the foreign policy of the United States, lend appropriate support to initiatives, resolutions, and programs designed to maximize
international cooperation in anticipating and preventing a decline in
the quality of mankind's world environment."' ° As one might imagine, the lack of clear congressional guidance regarding whether NEPA
and the environmental impact requirement extend to federal actions
causing overseas environmental effects has led to conflicting interpretations of the statute and, inevitably, to litigation.
A. Executive Order 12,114 and NEPA Litigation
In January 1979, the Carter Administration extended NEPA's application through Executive Order 12,114,101 which requires federal
agencies and departments to establish procedures "to facilitate environmental cooperation with foreign nations" when undertaking "major" actions with significant environmental effects outside of domestic
96. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(2).
97. See supra note 15.
98. One should be aware that numerous state agencies throughout the United

States have enacted state "little NEPA" statutes to apply within their borders. See,
e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21177 (West 1986); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§§ 8-0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 43.21C.01043.21C.910 (West 1983).
99. Extraterritoriality is defined as "the jurisdictional concept regarding a nation's
authority to adjudicate the rights of parties or to establish norms of conduct applicable to activities or persons outside its borders." McHugh, supra note 9, at 598. To
avoid conflicts between domestic laws and the laws of other sovereign nations, there
is a presumption against extraterritoriality, meaning that "United States statutory
laws should apply only to conduct which occurs within, or has effect within, the territory of the United States." Id. at 598-99. For further discussion of the presumption
against extraterritoriality, see M. Victoria Bayoneto, The Former U.S. Bases in the
Philippines:An Argument for the Application of U.S. Environmental Standards to
Overseas Military Bases, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 111, 144-48 (1994).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(F) (1988).
101. Exec. Order No. 12,114, 3 C.F.R. § 356 (1980).
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borders. °2 The Order explicitly requires the preparation of an EIS
for "major Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of
the<global commons outside the jurisdiction of any nation (e.g., the
Oceans and Antarctica).' ' 03 Since 1979, several groups of plaintiffs
have asserted that Executive Order 12,114 mandates the extraterritoof NEPA. For instance, in Greenpeace USA v.
rial application
104
Stone, environmental groups brought an action to halt the transportation and proposed destruction of approximately 100,000 rounds of
nerve gas by the U.S. Government. Pursuant to an agreement between the Reagan Administration and German Chancellor Helmut
Kohl, the U.S. Army and Department of Defense ("DOD") had embarked on a joint plan with the West German Army to remove the
chemical weapons from their storage site in Clausen, Germany and
ship them to Johnson Atoll for eventual disposal in the Johnson Atoll
Chemical Agent Disposal System ("JACADS"). 105 Plaintiffs asserted
that the U.S. Army and the DOD violated NEPA by, among other
things, failing to prepare a comprehensive EIS covering all aspects of
the transportation and disposal of the German stockpile.'0 6
In Greenpeace,the District Court of Hawaii held that NEPA did not
prohibit the U.S. Government's action. First, the court pointed out
that, although NEPA's language indicates "that Congress was con102. Id. § 2, 2-2.
103. Id. § 2, 1 2-3(a) (emphasis added). Executive Order 12,114 also applies to
"major federal actions" that significantly affect: (1).foreign nations not participating
with the United States in the actions; (2) foreign nations to which the United States
exports a "product or physical project" producing "an emission or effluent, which is
prohibited or strictly regulated in the United States" because it poses a toxic or radioactive threat; and (3) a designated "natural or ecological resource[] of global importance." Id. § 2, I 2-3(b)-(d).
However, Executive Order 12,114 specifically excludes a number of categories of
federal actions from the environmental impact requirement. Among those activities
excluded from coverage under the Order are: (1) Presidential actions; (2) actions
taken pursuant to the direction of the President or a Cabinet officer involving national security or occurring during the course of an armed conflict; (3) "intelligence
activities and arms transfers"; (4) the granting of "export licenses or permits or export
approvals"; (5) "votes and other actions in international conferences and organizations"; and (6) "disaster and emergency relief action[s]." Id. § 2, 2-5(ii)-(vii).
Significantly, under Executive Order 12,114, the EPA and other government agencies are not required to review and comment on environmental impact statements
prepared pursuant to the Order. KEITH 0. FULTZ, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT-IMPROVED PROCEDURES NEEDED FOR ENVIRONMENTAL AsSESSMENTS OF U.S. AcrIONs ABROAD (1994), available in LEXIS, News

Library, Curnws File. Moreover, Executive Order 12,114 does not mandate public
comment during the environmental assessment process and expressly exempts federal
agency action taken pursuant to the Order from judicial review. Id.
104. 748 F. Supp. 749, 752 (D. Haw. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir.
1991). For a thorough discussion of this case, see George H. Keller, Note, Greenpeace USA v. Stone: The Comprehensive Environmental Impact Statement and the
ExtraterritorialReach of NEPA, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 751 (1992).
105. Greenpeace USA, 748 F. Supp. at 752.
106. Id. at 754.
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cerned with the global environment and the worldwide character of
environmental problems, it does not explicitly provide that its requirements are to apply extraterritorially."'' 7 Second, the court indicated
that an extraterritorial application of NEPA to the U.S. action in Germany with the approval and cooperation of the German Government
"would result. in a lack of respect for [Germany's] sovereignty, authority and control over actions taken Within its borders." 108 Lastly, the
court declared that Executive Order 12,114, by its terms, only applies
to the "global commons" and not to the jurisdiction of any sovereign
nation. x° Therefore, the Greenpeace court concluded that Executive
Order 12,114 did not mandate the preparation of a more extensive
EIS for the entire operation, because the one already prepared adequately covered-and indeed was only required to cover-the potential adverse
impacts on the ocean, which is part of the "global
' 0
commons. 11
. Similarly, in EnvironmentalDefense Fund,Inc. v. Massey,"'
the En-

vironmental Defense Fund ("EDF") brought an action to enjoin the
National Science Foundation ("NSF") from incinerating food-related
waste and selected domestic waste at NSF's McMurdo Station in Antarctica. EDF argued that NSF violated NEPA, CEQ regulations, and
Executive Order 12,114 by failing to prepare a proper EIS for the operation of an interim and a permanent incinerator at the research station.' 12 NSF countered by contending that: (1) NEPA does not apply
to federal agency actions outside of the United States and (2) 3Executive Order 12,114 does not create a private cause of action."
The District Court determined that NEPA should not be applied
extraterritorially. In rejecting EDF's argument, the court declared
that one:
cannot ferret out a clear expression of Congress' intention that
NEPA should apply beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States .... While Congress may have selected broad language
to describe NEPA's purpose, Congress failed to provide a clear expression of legislative intent through a plain statement of extraterritorial statutory effect. 14

Moreover, the District Court held that Executive Order 12,114 did not
permit EDF to bring the lawsuit, because the Order "states that 'nothing in this Order shall be construed to create a cause of action.' ,"s
107. Id at 759.
108. Id at 760.
109. Id. at 762.
110. Id. at 763.
111. 772 F.Supp. 1296, 1297 (D.D.C. 1991), rev'd & remanded, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C.
Cir. 1993).
112. Id.
113. Id
114. ld.

115. Id. at 1298 (citing Exec. Order No. 12,114).
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Accordingly, the District Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction as moot." 6
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed. 117 The court framed the issue as "whether a federal agency
may ... take actions significantly affecting the human environment in
Antarctica without complying with NEPA and without being subject
to judicial review.""' 8 The Court held that the presumption against
the extraterritorial application of statutes is not implicated where (1)
the conduct regulated by the statute occurs primarily, if not exclusively, in the United States," 9 and (2) the alleged extraterritorial effect will take place in an area without a sovereign and which the
United States exercises some measure of legislative control. 2 °
Thus, the Circuit Court concluded in Massey that since Antarctica is
a continent without a sovereign, and because the United States controls all air transportation, search and rescue operations, and has significant research installations, the case neither, presented an
extraterritoriality problem nor hindered U.S. foreign policy goals.121
Significantly, while the Circuit Court determined that NEPA applied
to the actions of the United States research station in Antarctica, it
expressly limited its ruling by declining to decide whether NEPA applies to actions. involving' an internationally recognized sovereign
power. 22
Most recently, in NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin,'23 plaintiffs
brought an action against the Secretary of Defense, asserting that
NEPA required the DOD to prepare EISs for certain U.S. military
installations in Japan. Citing the Circuit Court's decision in Massey,
the NEPA Coalition court determined "that the legal status of the
United States bases in Japan [was] not analogous' to the status of
American research stations in Antarctica.' 1 24 The court noted that, in
the dispute at issue,
pursuant DOD operations in Japan were governed 125
ant to the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, and
the Status of Forces Agreement ("SOFA"),126 .which constituted, in
116. Id.

117. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
118. Id at 530.
119. Id. at 531.
120. Id. at 533.
121. Id. at 533-34.
122. Id at 537.
123. 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
124. Id. at 467.
125. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of
America and Japan, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 11 U.S.T. 1633-35.
126. Administrative Agreement Under Article III of the Security Treaty Between
the United States of America and Japan, Feb. 28, 1952, U.S.-Japan, 3 U.S.T. 3342-62.
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the view of the
court, "complex and' long standing treaty
27
arrangements."1
The court indicated that requiring the DOD to prepare EISs would
intrude upon the treaty relationship, because it would "necessarily require the DOD to collect environmental data from surrounding residential and industrial complexes [as well as Japanese military
activities], thereby intruding on Japanese sovereignty." 1 28 Thus, the
NEPA Coalition court concluded that the presumption against extraterritoriality "particularly applies" in instances where "there are clear
foreign policy and treaty concerns involving a security
relationship be' 29
tween the United States and a sovereign power.'
B.

United States Prospects for the Implementation of the
Espoo Convention

As the aforementioned cases illustrate, presently it is extremely difficult to effectively apply NEPA to extraterritorial situations in which
transboundary pollution effects are at issue. Clearly, the narrow D.C.
Circuit Massey precedent supporting the extraterritorial application of
NEPA is inapposite to the Espoo Convention, because the Conven•tion was signed by, and indeed was created to inform and protect,
sovereign nations from transboundary environmental impacts-not
merely -to safeguard the "global commons." Thus, domestic courts
would likely be reluctant under the current legal and administrative
framework to apply NEPA to the Espoo Convention, since there
would by definition be involvement with, and therefore infringement
upon, control over internal policy of other sovereign nations within
their own borders.
Accordingly, for the United States to effectively implement the Espoo Convention, Congress should explicitly amend NEPA to apply extraterritorially. To assuage the fears of national legislatures over the
state sovereignty and national security issues, the Espoo Convention
specifically stipulates that "[t]he provisions of this Convention shall
not affect the right of [p]arties to implement national laws, regula'tions, administrative provisions or accepted legal practices protecting
information the supply of which would be prejudicial to industrial and
commercial secrecy or national security."' 3 ° Without congressional
action, federal agencies may choose to disregard the Espoo Convention's mandates not only due to the lack of a super enforcement authority, but also because, under current interpretations of NEPA,
courts within the United States would probably not find them under a
legal duty to do so.
127. NEPA Coalition, 837 F. Supp. at 467.
128. Id. at 467 n.5.

129. Id. at 468.

130. Espoo Convention, supra note 9, art. 2(8).
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This is unfortunate, because EIAs can be an important tool in assisting federal agencies to reduce or prevent damage to other nations
from actions under their control. As Professor Robinson has pointed
out:
Because "the foreign policy of the United States" traditionally has
not considered conservation or environmental protection to be a
high priority, and because Executive Order 12114 appearedto excuse agencies from trying to identify innovative ways, to assess the
environmental impacts of government actions abroad, federal agencies have .devoted very little attention to section 102(2)(F) [of
NEPAJ.13 '
The utilization of EIAs is an effective method to evaluate the potential physical effects of biospheric change and provide a scientific basis
132
for their consideration in concrete governmental decision-making.
Yet, until government agencies required to comply are consistently
held accountable for their actions, the
benefits of environmental im133
pact review cannot be fully realized.
III.

IMPROVING THE PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

In-light of the Espoo Convention's shortcomings, one may legitimately query how its mandates can be implemented and enforced in a
more uniform, equitable, and effective manner. Undoubtedly, this is a
very complex inquiry to which there are no simple prescriptive solutions. Nevertheless, efforts can be made to better facilitate the transnational realization of the Espoo Convention's EIA requirements.
This Part of the Note will explore several of those avenues, focusing
on how they serve as surrogates for the Convention's lack of a super
enforcement authority.
A. Enhancing Management Capability
As part of the effort to halt environmental degradation, the States
implementing the Espoo Convention should be encouraged to improve the management of resource use and environmental protection
within their own borders. Specifically, those nations can, among other
things, further develop and enhance information systems, employ and
131. Robinson, supra note 91, at 606. For a discussion of NEPA section 102(F), see
supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
132. Robinson, supra note 91, at 607; GURUSWAMY ET AL., supra note 4, at 411.
133. One commentator has observed that while the American people have become
more concerned with global environmental problems, our government continues, albeit to a diminishing degree due to public pressure, "to formulate policies motivated
more by immediate self-interest than by long-term concerns." Ranee K.L. Panjabi,
Idealism and Self-Interest in InternationalEnvironmental Law: The Rio Dilemma, 23
CAL. W. INT'L L.. 177, 180 (1992).
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train qualified technical personnel, and strengthen legal and adminis34
trative means to methodically and cooperatively plan resource use.

To reduce the quantity and variety of pollutants released into the
environment, Espoo Convention signatories, which are principally industrialized nations, must develop domestic strategies to more comprehensively identify, monitor, and control the contaminants .they
generate and release. Heavily polluting industrialized nations, which
tend to have more complex and better funded systems of environmental regulation than developing nations, have found that the best way
to reduce pollution is to control what goes into the "waste stream"that is, to stop the production of waste at its source. 35 For instance,
pollution can be reduced by tighter emissions controls, changes in inplant processes and raw materials, and more extensive utilization of
recycling. 36
Upon analysis, one sees that the EIA process is particularly wellsuited to resource management programs, because such programs
must involve the individuals and groups that are directly affected by
them in both the planning and implementation stages. 37 Quite often,
"[c]entral governments and large organizations are .

. .

unaware of

local needs, preferences, opportunities, -and managerial skills; yet
these factors are often the key to successful resource management and
environmental protection.' 1 38 As one commentator has noted:
[plersons who are affected by [governmental] actions are often in
the best position to provide much of the specific information: necessary for wise rule formation. An opportunity for interested persons
to inform appropriate administrators of facts, views, or arguments
that they consider relevant to a proposed project39 is, therefore, necessary for the sound operation of government.1
Thus, assuming it is adhered to, the Espoo Convention's EIA procedure might very well play an important role in improving the management of resource usage, because it provides for the input of local
communities and interest groups and allows them to exercise a14degree
°
of control over "crucial decisions affecting their livelihoods.'
B.

Economic Incentives

In addition to improving management capability and better utilizing
domestic environmental laws, market-based economic incentives can
be employed to reduce the transboundary pollution problem. While
134. THE GLOBAL ECOLOGY HANDBOOK: WHAT YOU CAN Do ABOUT THE ENViRONMENTAL CRIsIs 319 (W.H. Corson ed., 1990) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECOLOGY].
135. GURUSWAMY ET AL., supra note 4, at 674-75.
136. Id at 674.
137. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 319.
138. Id.
139. Wirth, Reexamining InternationalLaw, supra note 89, at 776.
140. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 319.
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traditional command-and-control ("CAC") approaches rely on uniform, technology-based standards issued by the central government,
market-based approaches create economic incentives for industry to
achieve environmental goals, defining those, goals in terms of environmental performance rather than technology, and "leaving the choice
of specific response and compliance strategies to each individual enterprise."''1 1 Such incentives have been implemented to a limited degree by the United States and several European nations to create both
economic and environmental benefits.' 42 The benefits of integrating
market incentives into environmental policy, to supplement or. supplant CAC strategies, include: promotion of economic growth, improved environmental quality, greater recycling and energy efficiency,
and lower pollution. control costs'. 43 Significantly, some authorities
conclude that control over the reduction of environmental pollution
"can be made more efficient by shifting from [traditional] fixed con1' 44
trol standards to approaches using market-based incentives.'
In the United States, for instance, a transferable discharge permit
45
trading system has been developed for air and water emissions.'
Under'such a system, government "imposes a constraint on the total
quantity of emissions" and "issues allowances adding up to that total"
that emitters can reallocate among themselves.'" The system is
rather flexible, because an emission standard need not be met by each
individual pollution source, but rather by a group of sources within a
specified region. 147 New sources of pollution may commence operations if their contamination is more than offset by reduced emissions
of other preexisting sources in the area. 48 Therefore, it is conceivable
that in the international arena nations can join into emissions trading
pacts on a regional basis and reduce transboundary pollution49without
being under the auspices of a super enforcement authority.

141. Daniel J. Dudek et al., Technology-Based Approaches. Verses Market-Based
Approaches, in GREENING INTERNATIONAL LAW 182, 182 (Philippe Sands ed., 1994).
142. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 318. In the United States, for instance,
market-based approaches have been successfully employed in certain applications to
reduce compliance costs by 20-50%. Dudek et al., supra note 141, at 183.
143. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 318-19.
144. Id. at 319.

145. Id.
146. Dudek et al., supra note 141, at 192.
147. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 319; see also Robert W. McGee & Walter E. Block, Pollution Trading Permits as a Form of Market Socialism and the Search
for a Real Market Solution to Environmental Pollution, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 51
(1994).
148. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 319.

149. See Dudek et al., supra note 141, at 192 (noting that market-based incentives
"may find useful application in many countries, as well as in international instruments
of regional and global application").
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C. Involving Developing Nations
Due to its regional scope under the auspices of the ECE, the Espoo
Convention only applies to a relative handful of nations in a somewhat limited geographic area. The signatories to the Convention comprise only about one-seventh of the approximately 190 nations on the
planet.15 ° While the Convention represents, in some respects, a positive step forward for the ECE nations, a more inclusive global approach is needed to involve the vast majority of nations, including
many developing nations, that are not participants in its transnational
EIA process. Clearly, industrialized nations are not the only parties
responsible for environmental degradation; and therefore mechanisms
must be explored to reduce ecologically unsustainable, resource exploitive practices by developing nations.
One potentially effective mechanism to ensure that developing nations consider the environmental consequences of their actions has
been the EIA procedures instituted by the World Bank. In 1980, the
World Bank and five regional development banks adopted the Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures relating to Economic
Development,1 5 1 an agreement "to institute procedures to examine all
development activities to ensure they are environmentally sound."' 2
Since that time, the World Bank has established an environmental department, conducted country environmental studies, published environmental issues papers,'153 "increased environmental staffing
sevenfold and has strengthened the link between" environmental
quality and its lending policies.15 1 Since the late 1980s, for instance,
"well over a third of the Bank's loans [have] contained significantenvironmental components, and there are indications that the growing
concern for the 'environment
will be even more evident in future lend5
ing Operations.'
In 1989, the World Bank adopted Operational Directive 4.00, an
outline of the Bank's investment lending operations designed "to
ensure that development options under its consideration are environmentally sound and sustainable .

.

. and that environmental conse-

quences are acknowledged. early in the planning process.' 1 56 The

World Bank's EIA procedures, "[o]n paper ... primarily codify existing mechanisms, but in practice ... will mean far greater local in-

volvement in project preparation and a more systematic approach to
150. Sands I, supra note 17, at xvii, xix.

151. Declaration of Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to Economic
Development, Feb. 1, 1980, reprintedin 19 I.L.M. 524 (1980).

152. Kass & Gerrard I, supra note 5, at 29.
153. SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 1217.
154. GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 320.
155. Jeremy Warford & Zeinab Partow, Evolution of the World Bank's Environ-

mental Policy, in SCHOENBAUM & ROSENBERG, supra note 3, at 1217.
156. Kass & Gerrard I, supra note 5, at 29.
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the issue-all loans will be subject to such an assessment unless specifically exempted."' 57 Within the past year, the Bank has substantially
revised its EIA procedures and "has moved to supplement those procedures with an independent panel to review and report on the implementation of World Bank• [EIA]
conditions and mitigation measures
1158
for Bank-financed projects.
While the World Bank may be effective. in implementing its EIA
procedures, one may ask another, more normative question: whether
developed nations and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs")
have the right to require developing nations to adhere to such procedures. Thus, although developing nations can be made to conduct
EIAs, one must also query whether they should be made to do so.
After all, industrialized nations gained their very wealth and development via large-scale exploitation of their own resources and the resources of other nations, often with very severe environmental
consequences. 159 Therefore, an equity issue is raised when developing
nations are prohibited, or at least restricted, from doing the same to
gain identical economic and technological results.
In the past several decades, the international community has determined that environmentalism and economic growth are inextricably
linked. Professor Edith Brown Weiss has argued that, at the Rio Conference, "countries reached a consensus that environmental protection and economic development must be partners to achieve the
common goal of environmentally sustainable development."' 6 ° Initially, it may appear difficult, if not impossible, to conceptualize the
essential nexus between economic development and environmental
conservation. Unfortunately, the present generation is all to often
skeptical of solutions that appear "costly" and/or "socially disruptive"
in the short-term, and that have benefits that cannot be immediately
recognized because they accrue to future generations. However, in
seeking to achieve sustainable" development, both developed and developing nations are beginning to .realize that States and multinational
157. Warford & Partow, supra note 155, at 1218.

158. Kass & Gerrard II, supra note 10, at 9.
159. Indeed, today
developed nations enjoy a pre-eminence in the global economy both because
they reaped the fruits of their own endeavor within the nation state and also
because they could command at will and even at whim the enormous resources of the colonies. There would be no First World. today with a minority of the world's population enjoying a comfortable life-style if the majority

of the world's people in what used to be called the Third World had not
contributed the incredibly cheap rubber, cotton, minerals, oil and labor (including slave labor) which enabled ... Europeans and Americans to indus-

trialize, produce cheap factory goods and sell these back to the areas of their
empires which had provided the raw materials.
Panjabi, supra note 133, at 181.

160. Edith Brown Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Development: A Comment,
102
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corporations that "may be tempted to pay a heavy price in environmental degradation in order to compete for [immediate] economic
gain" must be discouraged from such practices.' 6 '
At its core, sustainable development is an intergenerational issue, as
all nations have a responsibility to maintain the biological integrity of
our global environment, as well as a duty to preserve economic viability, for future generations to survive and prosper. Several illustrations
will help to put the issue into its proper perspective.
First, without sustainable development, future geneiations will have
to pay a greater amount for the same goods and services available
today, due to greater scarcity and the increasing funds that would
have to be allocated to cover interest on. national debts. 162 Second,
when nations degrade their environment or otherwise fail to maintain
"environmental robustness," they impose enormous remedial costs on
future generations to attempt to repair or mitigate the damage that
has been done, thereby diverting resources from other, more beneficial investments and activities. 63 One must acknowledge, then, that
the effort to prevent or reduce transboundary pollution today will be
far less costly now than in the future, not to mention more ecologically
sound." 6 Lastly, contemporary, improperly checked development diminishes the quality of life of future generations by reducing the natural resource "options" available them, such'as by limiting the uses, and
forests, lakes, rivers, and other
even continued existence of, beaches,
165
areas.
recreational
and
scenic
In short, "[t]he notion that future generations have rights to inherit
a [healthy] environment provides a solid normative underpinning for
the idea of environmentally sustainable development.' 66 The utilization of EIAs and other measures to ensure sustainable development
serves the best interests of all parties concerned. As the concept of
sustainable development continues to gain acceptance, and as institutions such as the World Bank demonstrate the utility of EIAs, developing nations may very well voluntarily adopt and expand their own
161. Id. at 2124.
162. Id
163. Id
164. While "[tihe short-term monetary costs of preventing pollution, resource depletion and other environmental damage can be substantial... the economic and
other costs of repairing ecological damage after it has occurred are often many times
greater." GLOBAL ECOLOGY, supra note 134, at 325. Moreover, certain environmental harm such as species extinction and topsoil erosion cannot be reversed at any cost.
Id. Through pollution controls, many industrialized nations have "avoided costly
damage to health, property, and the environment, and ha[ve] made many industries
more resource-efficient and thus more profitable." Id. Clearly, developing nations
could reap similar benefits by doing the same.
165. Weiss, supra note 160, at 2124.
166. Id
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EIA procedures,'67 allowing them to better plan and execute development with potential transboundary pollution effects.
CONCLUSION

The environmental challenges that exist today, and will no doubt,
exist to an even greater extent in the future, extend well beyond the
capabilities of individual nations acting separately. Global environmental problems, such as transboundary pollution, can only be solved
by a genuine, concerted effort on the part of all nations, developed
and developing. The Espoo Convention, while flawed, is a decisive
step in the right direction, because it envisions, through its EIA procedure, a decidedly transnational approach to a pressing international
environmental issue. One should view the Convention as part of a
much larger effort needed to reduce and prevent transboundary
pollution.
Greater awareness and sensitivity, funding, communication, research and cooperation, along with the creation of more effective domestic and international legal and administrative schemes, are
essential to controlling the contamination of our biosphere. Ultimately, however, each individual nation must put perceived sovereignty and short-term economic interests aside, in favor of the greater
global interest in sustainable development and environmental conservation, for the sake of the present and all future generations. Therefore, each nation must realize that it is a member of the global
community, an inseparable part of the whole, requiring it to be environmentally conscious when formulating and implementing policies
with transnational implications, and willing to join its neighbors in
halting the destruction of our common biosphere.

167. Kass & Gerrard II, supra note 10, at 9.

